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Abstract
Prediction markets serve as popular devices to aggregate beliefs and to assess market
estimated probabilities. By looking at the interaction between real- and play-money
prediction markets, this paper shows that traded volume has a significant positive effect
on the probability of real- and play-money market cointegration. This indicates that
the information aggregation process, eliminating individual traders’ biases, operates even
when not inducing truthful belief revelation with monetary incentives. The study is based
on data from four markets covering the 2008 presidential election in the United States of
America.
JEL Classification: D8; G1.
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1 Introduction
A prediction market is a market where contracts on the outcome of a future event is traded.
By aggregating dispersed beliefs into prices, prediction markets generate market estimated
probabilities of a specified event becoming true. Due to design flexibility and prediction
accuracy, prediction markets are gaining popularity, and has lead to corporations, including
Google, Hewlett Packard (HP), Intel, and Microsoft, implementing such markets (Cowgill,
Wolfers, & Zitzewitz, 2008).
Microsoft implemented an experimental prediction market, with positive results, where
participants could place bets on anticipated release dates or the number of software patches
that would be released within a certain time frame (Kiviat, 2004). Also an experiment at
HP shows promising results where prediction markets were able to outperform official sales
forecasts in 75% of the markets (Chen & Plott, 2002). While these examples indicate the
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wide ranging areas where prediction markets can be successfully employed, the success often
depends on the design and implementation of the specific prediction market (Leigh & Wolfers,
2007).
One of the fundamental design differences is that between markets based on real- and
play-money. On the one hand, in real-money markets monetary incentives are used to make
market participants reveal their true beliefs about a future event. In play-money markets,
on the other hand, no monetary incentives are present, and thus there is no financial gain
of revealing one’s true beliefs about a future event. Hence, in such a market, participants
may manipulate prices without a financial loss. As a result, if market estimated probabilities
are to be trusted, it is plausible to expect that real-money markets are to be preferred over
play-money markets. National legislation, however, often restricts unlicensed operation of
betting markets using real-money, and therefore, the use of play-money might be the only
feasible alternative. Given the obstacle of operating a real-money market, can a play-money
market be a viable alternative? Or, in other words, do play-money markets, operating without
monetary incentives, behave similarly to real-money markets?
By testing for cointegration and long-run contract price adjustment in a bivariate setting,
the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between real- and play-money
prediction markets. The data were obtained from two prediction market operators using the
same trading platform, and thus consist of the exact same set of contracts. The study includes
four markets covering the 2008 presidential election in the United States of America. The
markets are: the democratic party nominee, the republican party nominee, the individual
election winner, and the winning party.
Results show that a majority of the contracts are not cointegrated, and that traded volume
positively affects the probability of cointegration. In other words, increased volume help the
real- and play-money market to absorb and react to new information. This implies that, for
contracts traded at low volumes the real- and play-money markets react differently to new
information. While it is beyond this study to determine which of the two market types is
superior at low volumes, this finding sheds doubt upon the marginal trader hypothesis, which
argues that volume, to a large extent, is irrelevant to market efficiency. Further, we find
that there is no indication of the real-money market driving the play-money market. Hence,
evidence shows that monetary incentives do not foster information discovery.
The paper is outlined as follows: The second section discusses the relevant background
to, and hypotheses of, the study. The third section discusses the data, method, and empir-
ical findings of the econometric analysis. The fourth section presents the conclusion of the
econometric analysis and the final section discusses the findings.
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2 Background
2.1 Introduction to Prediction Markets
A prediction market is a financial market where contracts, whose values are tied to the
outcome of a future event, are traded (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). The idea is that the
price of a contract aggregates information that different market participants hold (Forsythe,
Nelson, Neumann, & Wright, 1992).
Consider a commodity future, such as a three months contract on crude oil. The price of
this future reflects current beliefs on the value of oil three months from now. A prediction
market is similar to a futures market, with the difference being that prediction markets rely
on current events, such as political elections instead of an underlying asset that is to be
delivered some time from now. The advantage of a prediction market is that many events
have an outcome that can be coded as a binary event, either a politician is elected or he is
not for example. This makes it possible to specify a contract that pays at expiry e.g. 100 if
the politician is elected and zero otherwise. This gives the contract a possible price range
between zero and 100. A notable feature of such a contract therefore is that the price divided
by 100 reflects the market estimated probability of the event becoming true. This type of
contract can of course also be applied on top of the futures market in the sense that one can
specify a contract paying 100 if the price of oil at date X is above $200, and zero otherwise.
The price would then reflect the probability that the price actually will exceed $200 at date
X. Such a contract is often referred to as a winner-takes-all contract (Wolfers & Zitzewitz,
2004).
The idea traces back to 1945 when Hayek asserted that “in a system where the knowledge
of relevant facts are dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate
actions of different people” (Hayek, 1945, p. 526). In a ground breaking study, motivated
by the hypothesis of Hayek, Forsythe et al. (1992) set up an experimental prediction market,
the Iowa Political Stock Market (IPSM), with the aim to predict the vote shares of the U.S.
presidential election in 1988. There were three contracts covering, the republican nominee,
the democratic nominee, and a final contract covering all other candidates. The results of
the experiment are astonishing, and the prediction errors for the three contracts were 0.0%-
points, 0.2%-points and 0.6%-points respectively. The IPSM results do not only impress when
compared to the actual outcome, but also when compared to election polls. Forsythe et al.
(1992, p. 1150) note that when comparing the IPSM to major polls, the data “suggests that
opinion polls are excessively volatile, certainly more so than can be attributed to sampling
error alone”.
Forsythe et al. (1992) argue that the accuracy of the IPSM can be attributed to the
existence of marginal traders. A marginal trader is defined as a trader who does not suffer
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from biased judgments and would thus trade on arbitrage opportunities in the market. Hence,
marginal traders benefit from the existence of biased traders who in turn create arbitrage
possibilities. By comparing the investments of marginal and biased traders, Forsythe et al.
(1992) find that marginal traders earn a higher return on their investments than a non-
marginal trader due to the lower judgment bias.
In addition to accuracy in prediction, Berg and Rietz (2003) highlight several additional
advantages of prediction markets. First, unlike polls, the markets are updated continuously.
Hence, the market price at any point in time will reflect the aggregated beliefs at that point
in time. Second, the use of prices significantly simplifies the aggregation of information that
would otherwise be difficult to quantify. Third, evidence suggests that individual biases are
overcome in the aggregate market.
Individual judgment biases often arise through wishful thinking, or in other words through
an optimistic bias, which implies that a market participant is overestimating the probability
of a desired outcome to occur (Forsythe, Rietz, & Ross, 1999). This means that a market
participant will buy and sell contracts at prices that are different from what an unbiased trader
might have done. Although many sources for such behavior can exist, Forsythe et al. (1999)
limit their investigation to the false consensus effect and the assimilation-contrast effect. The
false consensus effect is a bias where an individual tends to overestimate the proportion of
other people within a population sharing his beliefs. The assimilation-contrast effect leads
the market participant to react overly positive to positive news about a desired outcome.
Both effects lead market participants to overestimate the price of a contract for a desired
candidate, which in turn might affect contract prices of the market. Although possible, it is
not necessary that the biases will lead to changed market prices (Forsythe et al., 1999).
Another source of mispricing is the presence of mistakes. Mistakes, in contrast to biased
beliefs, cannot be economically motivated (Forsythe et al., 1999). A mistake can occur on
either the market making or the price taking side of the market. In both cases, however,
it involves foregoing a sure profit. In a study reviewed by Forsythe et al. (1999), evidence
suggests that market makers both are more experienced and make less mistakes than other
traders. Through mistakes, arbitrage opportunities are created, which means that the price
of a bundle covering all possible outcomes has a price different than the payout rate from
one event becoming true. The price deviation from the payout rate can be both positive
and negative. Whether or not arbitrage opportunities persist in a market is unclear. On the
one hand, in the IPSM arbitrage possibilities did not seem to endure. While, on the other
hand, laboratory experiments have shown that mispricing in markets can endure throughout
an experiment (Forsythe et al., 1999).
Prediction markets do regrettably not come without potential problems. Frequent crit-
icism involves price manipulation. The possibility to manipulate a market depends on the
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liquidity of the market; the thinner the market, the less money is required to manipulate it
(Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004, p. 119) report that “[t]here have
been several known attempts at manipulation of these markets, but none of them had much
of a discernible effect on prices, except during a short transition phase”. This observation
supports the argument that the existence of marginal traders, as argued by Forsythe et al.
(1992), indicate that price manipulation would be recognized by marginal traders as arbitrage
opportunities and thus quickly acted upon. Hanson (2006) argues that possibilities to ma-
nipulate prices are not exclusive to prediction markets, but can occur in other asset markets
as well. The author, however, acknowledges that manipulation of prices that are used as a
direct influence in decision-making, so called decision markets, may have severe consequences
on the outcome.
A further problem became evident when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) prediction market project caught the attention of the public. The DARPA market
was a U.S. government funded project to evaluate the use of prediction markets in predicting
geopolitical trends for policy purposes (Hanson, 2007). Results of the initial test phase were
promising, and significant progress on the use of combinatorial markets was done. This led
to the project receiving additional financing (Hanson, 2006). A turn came in the aftermath
of the attacks on September 11, 2001. By portraying the project as an opportunity to profit
from terrorism (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004), the government halted funding for the project
and forced the project to close down (Hanson, 2006), even though contracts directly related
to terrorism were beyond the scope of the project (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004).
2.2 Differences Between Real- and Play-Money Markets
Prediction markets can be designed in a wide variety of ways. One of the more common
distinctions is that between markets based on real- and play-money. The difference being
whether or not monetary incentives are present. This means that in a play-money market,
in contrast to a real-money market, participants do not bear a financial risk from trading
(Rosenbloom & Notz, 2006).
Read (2005) argues that behavior is affected in three ways as the result of monetary
incentives. First, the introduction of incentives may affect the cognitive exertion. This means
that, without being given a reward for a task, the cognitive effort may be lower. In other
words, incentives increase the stakes involved in a decision making process and thereby induce
people to increase their cognitive effort. Hence, increased cognitive exertion implies that there
would be stronger incentives for spending more time on the decision itself, which in turn
implies that monetary incentives drive information discovery.
Second, incentives might affect the motivational focus. Read (2005) argues that since
participants might have differing levels of intrinsic motivation for doing any task, monetary
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incentives can shift the motivational focus of the participants from intrinsic motivation to
extrinsic motivation. For an experimenter this can be a positive effect, even though the
overall motivation is lower, since it makes experimental evidence easier to interpret.
Third, and last, is the effect of an incentive as an emotional trigger. This effect is exempli-
fied through the finding that agents are either unable to correctly predict their own response
to a stimuli or cannot reproduce it at all. This has an important implication for the compar-
ison between real- and play-money markets, since it highlights the problem that participants
might not be able to anticipate the effect of a trade without the use of real-money. Read
(2005, p. 272) argues that “[t]he potential loss of real money, therefore, probably can elicit a
visceral reaction that can neither be experienced nor predicted in its absence”.
In a survey by Frey and Jegen (2001), the authors present irresistible evidence showing
how monetary incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation under certain circumstances.
Frey and Jegen (2001) argue that an incentive which is perceived as an attempt to control
an individual will crowd out intrinsic motivation whereas a supportive incentive will have the
opposite effect. Whether the net effect is positive or negative depends on the relative size of
the two effects. Hence, it could be that participants in the play-money market are motivated
by an intrinsic motivation to reveal their true beliefs, and thus the importance of monetary
incentives is diminished.
Apart from incentives, there are also other differences. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) note
that traded volumes in real- and play-money market differ quite substantially. The authors
argue that higher volumes are associated with higher accuracy, which would favor play-money
markets over real-money markets. Forsythe et al. (1999) argue to the contrary. According to
a laboratory study, the existence of marginal traders will bring the market into an efficient
state even at low volumes. The result is similar to the findings from the original IPSM where
marginal traders were seen as key to the market accuracy (Forsythe et al., 1992).
A second important difference concerns the ability to accumulate funds to trade with.
In a real-money market a participant can add money as he sees it fit. In a play-money
market, on the other hand, the participant is endowed with a certain amount of play-money
upon the creation of his account. The participant cannot buy additional funds, hence, “the
only way to amass wealth in a play-money exchange is by a history of accurate predictions”
(Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock, & Galebach, 2004, p. 244).
A third difference, while important for market design, might not influence trading behav-
ior, are legal differences on the national level. In many countries, it is often difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain licenses to operate a real-money prediction market due to restrictions
on gambling (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). By operating a play-money market, it is possible
to get around the legal problems of a real-money market.
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2.3 Evidence from Previous Studies
While most studies involve prediction markets where contracts are traded with real-money,
Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compare the predictive power of real- and play-money for 208
American football games. The authors examine how well the pre-game favorite, determined
by the market price, match the winner of the game. The real-money market, was correct in
65.9% of the games and the play money market was correct in 66.8% of the games (Servan-
Schreiber et al., 2004).
In a study by Rosenbloom and Notz (2006), a sequential probability ratio test is applied to
investigate the differences between real- and play-money markets. The study was performed
on contracts from team sports as well as the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) stock
index. The study concludes that, while overall the real-money market outperforms the play-
money market, there are differences between the sports and financial market contracts. In
the sports market, the differences in accuracy are statistically insignificant whereas in the
DJIA market, the real-money market is significantly better than the play-money market.
Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) speculate that the reason might be the widely available odds
that are published for sports markets. Such odds are unavailable for the DJIA, which may
contribute to the differences in pricing between the two market types.
In a third study, Luckner, Weinhardt, and Studer (2006) set up two experimental markets,
one based on real-money and one based on play-money. Participants bet on which team would
be leading the German soccer league at the end of the first half of the season 2005/2006. The
authors then compare the two markets by looking backwards at the average absolute deviation
(AAD) from the half season outcome. The study reveals that the play-money market AAD
was closer to the outcome, as compared to the real-money market AAD, in 37 of the 50 trading
days. This finding led the authors to conclude that the play-money market outperforms the
real-money market. A problem arises through the fact that the observations in the study are
not independent of each other. After all, the AAD of a given trading day is not independent
of the AAD of previous trading days in the same market. As a result, it is not appropriate
to treat the 50 trading days as 50 independent observations. Instead, it is possible to look at
each market as a single observation; i.e., one observation describing the real-money market,
and one observation describing the play-money market. The problem for the study in question
is however that the number of observations, one for each market type, is below the number
required to draw statistically significant conclusions.
2.4 Hypotheses about Real- and Play-money Markets
A common characteristic for all three prior studies is that they ignore the time dimension
of the relationship between the real- and play-money markets. Accordingly, the purpose of
this paper is to investigate the real- and play-money market from a time series perspective.
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The theoretical framework has highlighted several differences between the two market types.
These differences are reflected by the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The sum of the contract prices for each market equals the payout rate of the
same market.
Hypothesis 2 The real- and play-money markets are cointegrated.
Hypothesis 3 The real-money market drives the play-money market.
Hypothesis 4 The contract volume does not affect the probability of a real- and play-money
contract pair being cointegrated.
The first hypothesis concerns the existence of arbitrage in the markets. Arbitrage exists
at any time when the sum of all contract prices within a market differs from the payout rate.
Given the media exposure and public interest in the primary election process in the United
States of America, we expect arbitrage, on average, to be non-existent.
The second hypothesis argues that since the markets are continuously updating their
prices, which are based on the beliefs of the market participants, the real- and play-money
market should be cointegrated. In other words, if participants base their decision making on
the same information, the markets should move together.
Read (2005) argues that monetary incentives strengthen the cognitive exertion. This
indicates that the incentive to conduct extensive information discovery is stronger in the real-
money market than in the play-money market. Hence, the third hypothesis specifies that the
real-money market is expected to drive the play-money market.
The fourth hypothesis concerns the effect of volumes. If marginal traders are present,
volume should not affect the cointegration between the real- and play-money markets.
3 Empirical Study
3.1 Data Description and Collection
To investigate the difference between real- and play-money in prediction markets, data on the
2008 presidential election and its primaries in the United States of America was collected.
The study is delimited to four markets: the democratic nomination market, the republican
nomination market, the individual election winner, and the winning party. All contracts are
of the winner-takes-all type. The time span analyzed varies slightly between the different
markets. An overview can be found in Table 1; a complete list of the contracts can be found
in Appendix A.
The real-money market is operated by Intrade and the play-money market is operated
by the Financial Times, under the name FTPredict.1 Both operators run on the Intrade
1http://www.intrade.com and http://www.ftpredict.com.
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Market Time Span (dd/mm/yyyy) No. of Contracts
Democratic Nomination 18/10/2007 – 24/05/2008 28
Republican Nomination 19/09/2007 – 24/05/2008 33
Winning Individual 11/09/2007 – 24/05/2008 18
Winning Party 10/02/2007 – 24/05/2008 3
Table 1: Overview of the markets.
platform and offer the exact same contracts for each market analyzed in this paper, with the
only difference being the contract creation dates and size of commission fees. The problem of
different creation dates for contracts within a market is solved by adjusting the initial date
of analysis in each market to the date where both markets started to offer a set of contracts
covering all possible outcomes.
The data is publicly available through the websites of the respective market operator and
was downloaded on May 25, 2008. It is in daily format, and includes observations until May
24, 2008. For each contract there are five variables that are recorded on a daily basis: opening
price, closing price, daily low, daily high, and daily volume. This study considers the daily
closing prices and the daily volumes.
Figure 1: Total volumes traded in the four markets (daily).
Both markets use equal price ranges, ranging from 0 to 100, with a precision of one
decimal. In the real-money market a price of 100 corresponds to a price of $10. A market
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participant can refill his account or withdraw money from it at any time. In the play-money
market each new account is endowed with $10,000 of play-money. The difference in monetary
costs of obtaining credit to trade for is visible in Figure 1 where the total volume of the real-
and play-money market are graphed together. The play-money market volumes surpass the
real-money volumes substantially.2 Important to note when reading the graph is that it uses
a logarithmic scale.
Figure 2: Sum of contract prices in the different markets.
Consider the sum of all contract prices in a market. This is the price one would have to
pay, to buy a complete bundle of contracts that cover all possible outcomes in the market.
One would expect this price to be close to 100, which equals the payout rate for an event
that becomes true. If the total price exceeds 100, one can make a sure profit by selling a
bundle of all contracts and thus only committing oneself to pay 100 upon expiry. If, on the
other hand, the total price is below 100, one can buy a bundle and make a sure profit. As
can be seen in Figure 2, the total market price, almost constantly exceeds 100 for both the
real- and play-money markets. A reason could be that contracts cannot take a price below
0.1.3 Consider e.g. the democratic nomination market which has 28 contracts. Given that
2On average over the market specific time period, the ratio of play-money volume divided by real-money
volume is for the democratic market: 15.67; republican market: 19.60; individual winner: 30.90; and winning
party: 18.53.
3It is highly improbable that someone will sell a contract at a price of 0.0. Hence, the lowest price that a
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at the time of the data retrieval only two candidates remained in the race, there must be 26
contracts with a price of 0.1, or close to this value. This means that the total market price
can be overestimated by at least 2.6 units, without there being real arbitrage opportunities.
In addition, there is a possibility that there are not enough buyers willing to trade contracts
that cover candidates who have dropped out. This would mean that the price might not even
reach its minimum of 0.1 and thus contribute to the overpricing of the complete bundle.
To illustrate this issue, Figure 3 shows the summed price of Obama and Clinton, covering
only the time period for which they were the only remaining candidates in the race.4 It
is notable to see that the mean aggregate price of the two candidates, in both markets, is
approximately 99.5 In contrast to the complete market, the Clinton-Obama bundle price is
slightly less than 100 on average, which can be explained by a sort of interest rate argument.
By giving up 99 now, one can get 100 sometime in the future. The price of the complete bundle
therefore suggests that the markets fail to adequately adjust the prices for candidates who
are no longer competing for the nomination. This in turn suggests that the more contracts
there are in a market, the more distorted the price of the complete bundle will be, due to the
inadequate adjustment process of the prices.
Figure 3: Aggregate price of the Clinton and Obama contracts.
The outcome of the democratic nomination market, the individual winner market, and
the winning party market were uncertain for the whole time span included in the study. In
the republican nomination market on the other hand, John McCain declared himself a winner
already on March 5, 2008.6 This made it highly improbable for any other candidate to win
the nomination and thus the uncertainty surrounding the election process diminished. At this
point the only factors which can lead to a different outcome are highly improbable events such
contract can take is zero plus the minimum tick size, which is 0.1.
4John Edwards, the third major democratic candidate, dropped out on January 30, 2008. Hence, the period
covered in this section is January 31, 2008 – May 24, 2008.
5Specifically, the average real-money price is 99.2 and the average play-money price is 99.3.
6New York Times Article: Big Wins for Clinton in Texas and Ohio; McCain clinches Race as Foe Concedes,
published on March 5, 2008, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/us/politics/05primary.html.
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as death. The republican time series was therefore divided into two separate sub-samples, as
is shown in Table 2. This division allows for an additional analysis of the Republican nominee
market after the point where John McCain secured the nomination.
Period Time Span (dd/mm/yyyy) Period Covers
1 19/09/2007 – 05/03/2008 Nomination period with multiple candidates
2 06/03/2008 – 24/05/2008 Nomination period with a single candidate
Table 2: Election period for the republican nominee divided in two sub-samples.
3.2 Design Differences
While the real- and play-money markets are very similar, there are a few design differences
that may have important implications for the comparison of the two market types. These
differences concern the present implementation of the markets used in this study, and thus
cannot be generalized to other real- and play-money markets. Hence, these differences exist
in addition to the ones discussed in the theoretical framework.
First, there is a difference in traded volume, observed in Figure 1, which arises from the
price of a contract. While in the play-money market every trader is endowed with $10,000
of play-money, each contract in the real-money market costs between $0 and $10. It is,
as discussed in the theoretical framework, possible that higher volumes are associated with
higher accuracy.
A second difference concerns commission fees. While both markets incorporate commission
fees, their size vary slightly. In the play-money market the commission fees amount to play-
$0.05, and in the real-money market, they vary from $0.00 to $0.05 depending on the type of
transaction. A further difference is that the real-money market incorporates a fixed expiry fee
of $0.10 (1% of the payout rate) for contracts that result in a positive profit (i.e. a participant
holds a winning position). The implementation of transaction costs in the play-money market
is an attempt to mimic trading behavior of the real-money market.
A third implementation difference is that the play-money market includes a ranking that
shows the performance of a participant in relation to other participants.7 This creates an
extrinsic motivation to participate and to reveal one’s true beliefs in order to rise through the
rankings. Such a ranking is not available in the real-money market. To measure the impact
of the differences highlighted here one will have to conduct a series of experiments.
3.3 Time Series Analysis
By applying a time series approach to the study of real- and play-money prediction markets,
one is able to look at the cross effect of the different markets over time and whether contracts of
7See http://www.ftpredict.com/aav2/leaderBoard/ for an example.
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the different markets move together or not. By using lagged values of a variable to explain the
current value of the same variable, one treats the variable as a priori endogenous (Lu¨tkepohl,
1999), which is a common occurrence in time series analysis. This technique requires one to
determine the number of lags to include in the analysis. The Akaike information criterion
(AIC) is used for this purpose.
The study, investigates whether there is causality as well as cointegration present in the
different markets. Cointegration occurs when there is a linear combination between at least
two non-stationary variables. In this sense, cointegration refers to a long-run equilibrium
between two or more variables.8 Causality can be determined when there either is a trend
in one variable to adjust toward a second variable, or when past values of one variable can
explain the present value of a second variable. We look at causality by using two different
techniques, first by looking at adjustment trends between two variables in a vector error cor-
rection framework and then by applying a Granger causality test to look for serial correlation
across the two markets.
3.3.1 Testing for Stationarity
Cointegration requires all variables to be integrated of the same order (Enders, 2004). This
means that for the bivariate analysis of real- and play-money markets, both contracts of
each pair has to be non-stationary, or integrated of order one. Stationary and non-stationary
time series exhibit several important differences in their characteristics. While a stationary
process has a constant mean in the long-run, this is not the case for a non-stationary process.
Hence, as time approaches infinity, the variance of a non-stationary time series also approaches
infinity (Enders, 2004).
For the purpose of detecting a non-stationary time series, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test is used, as discussed by Enders (2004). The ADF test allows for an arbitrary
number of lags to be included, with the null hypothesis of a unit root being present against
the alternative hypothesis of no unit root. When no unit root is present, a variable is said
to be integrated of order zero, which in other words means that the variable is stationary.
Hence, the value at time t is independent of the value at time t − 1. When, on the other
hand, a variable’s value at t depends on the value at t− 1, it is said to be non-stationary, or
integrated of order one.
The ADF test is applied on the levels as well as on the first differences of the variables.
By applying the test on the first differences, one can determine whether a time series contains
more than one unit root. A summary of the results is available in Table 3 and full results are
in Appendices B.1 and B.2.
8Equilibrium in the econometric sense implies that the variables have similar trends and the concept thus
is distinct from the notion of equilibrium in economic theory.
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ADF tests on levels ADF tests on first difference given I(1)
Order Number of Pairs Order Number of Pairs
0 4 0 29
1 30 1 0
D 11 D 1
Table 3: Summary of ADF unit root tests at the 5% level. (D: different orders for the two variables).
In total there are 115 contract pairs.9 Forty-five of the contract pairs exhibit a price
change in both variables, meaning that they respond to information changes in the market.
Since it is only interesting to consider pairs where both contracts react to information in the
market, all but 45 pairs are excluded from further analysis. The ADF test results further
narrow down the number of suitable contract pairs to 30, and by the first difference ADF test
one additional contract pair is excluded due to the possibility of multiple unit roots.
3.3.2 Cointegration Tests
Having determined the contract pairs where both contracts are integrated of order one, and
the first differences integrated of order zero, one can test for evidence of cointegration. If
cointegration is evident, it means that the real- and play-money contracts are moving together
and thus reacting similarly to information in the market. To test for cointegration we follow
the Johansen procedure and thereby determine a trace statistic to test the null hypothesis
of at least k cointegrating relationships between n variables, where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1},
against the alternative hypothesis of k + 1 ≤ n cointegrating relationships (Enders, 2004).
In other words, consider a scenario of two non-stationary variables that one suspects to be
cointegrated. With two variables there can be no or one cointegrating relationship. The
Johansen procedure, based on the trace statistic, tests whether there is no, or at least one
cointegrating relationship present.
No. of C.E. Number of Pairs
None 9
At least 1 18
(Reject both) 2
Table 4: Summary of cointegration test results at the 5% level. (C.E.: cointegrating equations).
By conducting a bivariate cointegration test between the real- and play-money contract
of each pair, the aim is to detect whether the two markets move together. A summary is
available in Table 4, which shows that a large fraction of the contract pairs are cointegrated.
However, it is important to note that a significant portion of the pairs cannot be determined
to be cointegrated. The full test results are available in Appendix B.3.
9The 115 pairs are divided as follows: 28 for the democratic nominee, 2×33 for the republican nominee
(divided into two sub-samples.), 18 for the individual winner, and 3 for the winning party.
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3.3.3 Causality Tests
The ADF tests show that many of the contract pairs are integrated of different orders in-
dicating that the real- and play-money contracts do not move together. In addition, the
cointegration tests of the contract pairs that are integrated of the same order provide in-
conclusive results: approximately 30% of the contract prices are determined not to move
together in the two markets. These results suggest that the two markets to a large extent
react differently on information in the market. Given these differences, it is still important to
analyze whether there is one market that drives the other market, or in other words, if there
is causality. We restrict attention to the contract pairs that are integrated of order one, i.e.
the same set of pairs that are present in the cointegration tests, since otherwise there is no
long-run adjustment process possible.
Since the variables are non-stationary, we construct a bivariate vector error correction
model (VECM). A VECM is similar to a vector autoregression (VAR) that is used for sta-
tionary processes, but in addition contains an error correction term to correct for the non-
stationarity. In a VAR, all variables are assumed to be endogenous, which as a result allows
a variable to be explained by its own lagged values. This means that a VAR, with k lags,
takes the following form:
yt = A1yt−1 + · · ·+Akyt−k + ut (1)
While the VAR model is general enough to model non-stationary and cointegrated vari-
ables, the cointegration is not made explicit (Lu¨tkepohl, 1999). A VECM provides a conve-
nient solution to this problem by introducing an error correction term, as well as modeling
the first difference instead of the levels, in order to remove any stochastic trend of the data.
While explaining the VECM deserves a section of its own, it is beyond the scope of this
paper, and we will therefore focus on the bivariate error correction model only. Consider the
following bivariate VECM between a play-money contract, denoted by the subscript p, and
the real-money contract, denoted by the subscript r with k lags, adapted from Enders (2004):
∆pp,t = A10 + αp(pr,t−1 − βpp,t−1) +
k∑
`=1
A11(`)∆pp,t−` +
k∑
`=1
A12(`)∆pr,t−` + up,t (2)
∆pr,t = A20 − αr(pp,t−1 − βpr,t−1) +
k∑
`=1
A21(`)∆pp,t−` +
k∑
`=1
A22(`)∆pr,t−` + ur,t (3)
where αp(pr,t−1−βpp,t−1) and −αr(pp,t−1−βpr,t−1) are the respective error correction terms;
The first summation in the VECM equations, represents the coefficients for the ` number of
lags included in the model from the play-money market, and the second summation represents
the same, but for the real-money market. The up,t and ur,t terms represent the disturbance
term of the model. A10 and A20 are the intercepts of the error correction model. Since the
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VECM is in first differences, any stochastic trend is isolated in the two α:s, which can be
seen as a speed of adjustment factor of one variable to the other, and vice versa (Enders,
2004). Hence, a large value of αp, indicates that the play-money market is responding to the
real-money market in the long-run. The opposite is true for small values of αp (i.e. close to
zero). By testing the restrictions of αp = 0 and αr = 0, one makes an inference about the
long-run causality between the two markets.
The results can be grouped into four categories: First, the play-money market drives the
real-money market. Second, the real-money market drives the play-money market. Third,
both markets drive each other. And, fourth, none of the markets drive each other. The results
are presented in Table 5, with full results available in Appendix B.4. The results do not give
clear implications for interpretation, but it is worth noting that in about two-thirds of the
contract pairs one market drives the other. What is unclear however, is the direction in which
this occurs. Dividing the results per market, indicates that the long-run correction direction
might be market specific.
Overall Results Market Specific Results
Category No. of Contracts Dem Rep Ind Party
Play-money drives real-money 7 4 0 3 0
Real-money drives play-money 12 1 4 6 1
Both markets drive each other 2 1 1 0 0
No market drives the other 9 2 4 2 1
Table 5: VECM α-restrictions (5% level).
In addition to the α-restrictions, a Granger causality (GC) test is applied on the contract
pairs. The GC test tests whether lagged values of one variable contains information that
explains the current value of another variable. An example of a GC test is whether lagged
values of the play-money contract helps to explain the current value of the real-money con-
tract, and vice versa. It is important to note that the presence of Granger causality does not
imply causality (Enders, 2004), but only that past values of one variable affect the current
value of another variable.
Overall Results Market Specific Results
Category No. of Contracts Dem Rep Ind Party
Play-money g.c. real-money 7 2 3 2 0
Real-money g.c. play-money 4 0 1 2 1
Both markets g.c. each other 6 4 1 1 1
No market g.c. the other 13 2 4 6 0
Table 6: Granger causality tests (5% level). (g.c.: Granger causes).
As with the α-restriction tests, there are four possible outcomes: First, the play-money
price Granger causes the real-money price, meaning that past prices of the play-money market
contains information on the current value of the real-money market. Second, the real-money
market price Granger causes the play-money price, which is equivalent to the reverse of the
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first possibility. Third, both markets may Granger cause each other, meaning that past
prices of both markets help explain the current value of them. Last, there may be no variable
Granger causing the other. The results available in Table 6, with full results available in
Appendix B.5, indicate no clear pattern of the direction at which Granger causality occurs.
Breaking up the results according to markets does not suggest any market specific patterns.
3.4 Volume Effects
The next step is to analyze whether the volume is related to presence of cointegration as well
as if there is a difference between the real- and play-money markets with respect to volume.
Accordingly, the following probit models are constructed:
P (Coint = 1 |RealV olume) = C + β1RealV olume+ u (4)
P (Coint = 1 |PlayV olume) = C + β1 PlayV olume+ u (5)
where Coint is a binary variable constructed from the cointegration results. It takes the value
of one when there is cointegration and the value of zero when there is no cointegration. All
contract pairs for which both variables at least once change prices are included in the analysis.
This corresponds to the same set of pairs that were present in the unit root tests. The variables
RealVolume and PlayVolume are summed over the time span of the different markets. The
slope at the mean of the volume variable for the different models can be interpreted as the
change in probability of cointegration from an increase of one unit in the traded volume on
average.
Model 1: Real volume, dependent variable: Coint
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-stat. p-value Slope (mean) Sig.
C -1.5091 0.369 1 -4.089 0.0000 ***
RealVolume 2.0971E-05 5.1591E-06 4.065 0.0001 8.2318E-06 ***
Number of cases ‘correctly predicted’ 40 (83.3%)
McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared 0.4261
Model 2: Play volume, dependent variable: Coint
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-stat. p-value Slope (mean) Sig.
C -1.3854 0.3433 -4.035 0.0001 ***
PlayVolume 7.2662E-07 1.7383E-07 4.180 0.0000 2.7562E-07 ***
Number of cases ‘correctly predicted’ 37 (77.1%)
McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared 0.3729
Table 7: Probit models. (***: 1% level).
The results in Table 7 show clear evidence of volume positively affecting the probability
of cointegration for both the real- and play-money market. The results are significant at the
1%-level. Hence, volume has a clear positive effect on the markets being cointegrated.
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3.5 A Closer Look at Period Two of the Republican Market
In period two of the Republican market, the only uncertainty left is that of highly improbable
events that would force John McCain to withdraw from the race. This fact makes it a logical
step to look at the market price in relation to the payout rate upon expiry, since it can give
a hint at what rate the market values the remaining risk. The market prices for the real-
and play-money market are presented in Figure 4. On May 24, the closing price of McCain
was 95.0 in the real-money market. Buying a contract for 95.0 on May 24 and expecting to
redeem 100 at expiry on September 1 when the Republican National Convention takes place,
equals an annual interest rate of 20.82%.10 Deducting a risk-free interest rate of 4.46%11, it
is obvious that the market is incorporating extraordinary levels of risk in the market, given
the current situation, of being the only candidate left in the market.
Figure 4: Price of McCain (March 6, 2008 – May 24, 2008).
The play-money market seems to exhibit the same behavior as the real-money market,
which can also be observed in Figure 4. While it is plausible that the market interest rate
for the real-money market reflects both the risk of McCain not being nominated and a return
for giving up money now and collecting them upon contract expiry, it is unclear why the
play-money market follows this behavior. In a play-money market there is no financial risk,
only risk of losing reputation within the prediction market ranking system. Hence, the results
suggest that the reputation risk is priced at a similar rate as the risk-free rate of return of
the real-money market. Another interpretation is that one of the markets follows the other
market, in other words, that there is evidence of Granger causality.
Results show that there is no evidence of Granger causality in any direction. Complete test
results are available in Appendix B.6. This is a notable result, since it hints at the two markets
operating independent of each other, yet at the same time pricing the contracts similarly.
10
(
value upon expiry
current value
) no. of days in a year
no. of days until expiry − 1 = ( 100
95
) 365
99 − 1 ≈ 0.2082.
1110 year German Bundesbank market bond rate from July 11, 2008, retrieved from http://markets.ft.com/
markets/bonds.asp.
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4 Conclusion
Previous studies comparing real- and play-money prediction markets, surveyed in the the-
oretical framework, aimed at determining which of the two market types outperformed the
other in terms of predictive accuracy. Such an approach is limited, since it does not take the
time dimension into account and thereby ignores how the two market types interact when
running in parallel. This study, therefore, aimed at exploring the time dynamics of the two
market types.
The empirical study, based on four prediction markets of the U.S. presidential election in
2008, has revealed several notable results:
Result 1 The sum of the contract prices does not equal the payout rate.
The sum of the contract prices for each market seems to have stabilized at values above
the payout rate for all four markets, in both the real- and play-money setting. This result
indicates that there is reason to reject hypothesis one, that the sum of the contract prices
should equal the payout rate. This result indicates the presence of persisting arbitrage in the
markets.
Result 2 A majority of the markets are not cointegrated.
We have determined that cointegration is only present in 40% of the contract pairs ex-
hibiting a price variance.12 Hence, the second hypothesis of cointegration between all markets
cannot be supported.
Result 3 The real-money market cannot be determined to drive the play-money market.
This result implies that the real-money market cannot be determined to be superior in
terms of information discovery because this would lead to a situation where the real-money
market drives the play-money market. This is clearly not the case. It is rather market specific
whether one market drives the other or vice versa.
Result 4 Volume has a significant and positive effect on the probability of cointegration.
Result four contradicts the argument of marginal traders making the markets efficient.
While it does not necessarily reject this argument, it shows that higher volumes might attract
marginal traders. Hence, as some authors have argued, that volume is largely irrelevant,
cannot be supported by this result. Linking this conclusion to the information absorption
power of the two markets, the result suggests that volume is more important than the presence
of monetary incentives.
12Cointegration is evident in 18 of the 45 contract pairs that show price variation.
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5 Discussion
The results suggest that for contracts with a relatively high volume, both prediction markets
run by play-money and real-money perform similarly. In connection with previous results,
showing that biases diminish in real-money markets (Forsythe et al., 1999), it is possible to
speculate that the force controlling the diminishing levels of biases, when moving from an
individual to a market, lies in the information aggregation process rather than in the use of
monetary incentives. If this is the case, its implications are far reaching, since it is, due to
legal obstacles, difficult to operate a real-money market in many places around the world. It
could also strengthen the interest in prediction markets of corporations wishing to improve
business forecasting. Under such circumstances, it is not plausible to assume that an employee
might want to participate if he has to risk parts of his own salary.
Another striking finding is that a large fraction of contracts are either not integrated of
the same order, or when integrated of the same order, not cointegrated. This shows that the
two markets operate in near isolation of each other. This means that the two markets react
on, and absorb, different information, something that one would not expect given that one
can access real-time quotes of both markets at any time. One can speculate that, given the
relatively high volumes in both markets, one of the markets cannot attract marginal traders,
and thus the market does not absorb critical information. Hence, one of the market types
could be superior to the other. It is difficult to speculate on the issue of which market is
the better one, partly because market participants can participate in both markets at the
same time making it difficult to assume that the markets are independent of each other; and
partly because the dataset does not contain information needed for such analysis. The study
is based on daily observations of the market closing prices. Since trades are executed around
the clock, this might not be the appropriate resolution to assess Granger causality or VECM
α-restrictions. To accurately assess whether or not one of the market drives or Granger
causes the other, trade level data would be required. One can, however, through the probit
analysis of volumes, conclude that higher volumes in both markets affect the probability of
cointegration in the markets. In other words, this result shows that, with higher volumes,
the markets start to react similarly on the same information. Hence, high volumes help both
market types to better absorb information. Which of the markets performs better in low
volume settings is however unclear.
Since there are no monetary incentives for participating in that market, one can speculate
that the similarity arises through the social-comparison competition that is present in play-
money markets. It could also be that the play-money market mimics the behavior of the
real-money market and would perform differently in isolation of a real-money market. While
to answer this question is beyond the scope of this study, it is an important question to
study. By implementing an experiment, the effect of running the markets in parallel could be
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determined. This is in particular important when determining the suitability of play-money
markets as substitutes for real-money markets.
The presence of sustained arbitrage in the markets is also a notable finding. Although
the existence of sustained overpricing might partly be caused by the existence of transaction
costs, it shows that market participants are unable to take advantage of arbitrage. Hence,
there seems to be a built in inefficiency in the market. In addition to the transaction costs,
one can speculate that the number of contracts available in a market will negatively affect the
pricing efficiency for the whole market. Essentially this is a design issue, because contracts
cannot be traded at prices below 0.1, the minimum tick size.
An additional result of the study, while not based on a hypothesis, is that the Republican
market, in the time period where McCain was the implicit nominee, and thus run without the
uncertainty of whom is to be elected, incorporates an interest rate of 20.82% on the contract
of McCain. This means that the market is incorporating outside risks of McCain not being
nominated as highly probable. Whether or not the McCain contract can be seen as a risk-free
investment is unclear, but the market signals that this is not the case. While it is difficult
to assess whether or not this is an appropriate interest rate, it is an arbitrage opportunity
that does not seem to be taken advantage of. Would there be a healthy fraction of marginal
traders, one would assume that the gap between the current contract interest rate and the
risk-free bond rate would shrink. This does not seem to be the case.
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A List of Contracts
Real-money Play-money
Market Contract Volume Creation Date Volume Creation Date
Democratic Clinton 371335 04/11/2004 4078313 10/02/2007
Nominee Obama 268018 05/11/2004 3856907 10/02/2007
Gore 121882 04/11/2004 1546492 10/02/2007
Edwards 61108 04/11/2004 1242080 10/02/2007
Richardson 21154 04/11/2004 673860 10/02/2007
Biden 17414 10/11/2004 619251 11/02/2007
Field 17122 15/09/2007 290131 19/09/2007
Dodd 4122 05/11/2004 237353 15/02/2007
Kicinich 3410 14/12/2006 82904 10/06/2007
Warner, M 1326 26/11/2004 72902 13/02/2007
Kerry 1302 04/11/2004 72412 13/02/2007
Bayh 1280 05/11/2004 72601 11/02/2007
Dean 1279 04/11/2004 80900 14/02/2007
Easley 1267 07/07/2005 79089 18/10/2007
Feingold 1227 21/12/2004 80420 13/02/2007
Clark 1223 04/11/2004 91301 10/02/2007
Daschle 1179 23/11/2005 90799 14/02/2007
Schweitzer 1179 07/07/2005 80299 01/03/2007
Vilsack 1179 09/11/2004 75610 10/02/2007
Bredesen 1169 17/02/2005 80198 14/02/2007
Rendell 1169 10/11/2004 77999 27/02/2007
Lieberman 1167 04/11/2004 74999 04/05/2007
Powell 1160 26/11/2004 71899 11/02/2007
Leahy 1158 05/11/2004 77798 18/10/2007
Ford 1156 10/11/2004 73799 18/10/2007
Corzine 1150 03/02/2005 71798 14/02/2007
Blagojevich 1095 11/04/2006 76098 22/09/2007
Gravel 1085 20/01/2007 71485 12/02/2007
Republican Huckabee 142695 15/06/2005 2164289 10/02/2007
Nominee McCain 111652 30/10/2004 1568072 10/02/2007
Romney 94928 30/10/2004 2628140 10/02/2007
Giuliani 84986 30/10/2004 1381142 10/02/2007
Paul 66126 20/01/2007 2007708 10/02/2007
Thompson, F 39033 10/03/2007 844537 10/03/2007
Rice 27267 30/10/2004 331806 10/02/2007
Gingrich 16351 30/01/2005 264983 10/02/2007
Field 11921 15/09/2007 216595 19/09/2007
Bloomberg 6018 17/11/2004 22742 10/02/2007
Hunter 4682 01/11/2006 171378 10/02/2007
Dole 3510 17/11/2004 5079 17/03/2007
Bush, J 861 30/10/2004 12309 10/02/2007
Tancredo 619 02/08/2006 4159 10/02/2007
Hagel 560 30/10/2004 4265 10/02/2007
Barbour 260 17/11/2004 4461 07/04/2007
Cheney 233 11/11/2004 4419 10/02/2007
Allen 111 30/10/2004 127953 10/02/2007
Sanford 100 16/03/2005 58657 15/02/2007
Pataki 21 30/10/2004 5151 12/02/2007
Powell 20 02/11/2004 28892 10/02/2007
Brownback 10 23/12/2004 4939 10/02/2007
Frist 10 30/10/2004 909 22/02/2007
Owens 10 30/10/2004 1911 10/02/2007
Thompson, T 10 30/10/2004 2581 10/02/2007
Schwarzenegger 5 05/11/2004 2 14/02/2007
Franks 0 16/12/2004 4909 07/04/2007
Gilmore 0 22/12/2006 42 10/02/2007
Graham 0 17/11/2004 105 07/04/2007
Pawlenty 0 19/02/2005 11519 14/02/2007
Ridge 0 30/10/2004 2102 07/04/2007
Santorum 0 17/11/2004 11127 10/02/2007
Warner, J 0 06/12/2006 1857 07/04/2007
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Real-money Play-money
Market Contract Volume Creation Date Volume Creation Date
Individual Clinton 194871 14/07/2006 3658370 10/02/2007
Winner McCain 184826 14/07/2006 4509718 10/02/2007
Obama 141207 24/10/2006 4233955 11/02/2007
Huckabee 137970 29/08/2007 4281330 28/08/2007
Romney 125890 29/08/2006 3436139 10/02/2007
Gore 113290 30/08/2006 2908596 15/02/2007
Giuliani 104064 30/07/2006 3039715 15/02/2007
Bloomberg 100005 24/06/2007 3009570 23/06/2007
Edwards 99132 30/07/2006 3225541 13/02/2007
Paul 88354 28/08/2007 3409533 28/08/2007
Thompson, F 64564 04/04/2007 2876025 04/04/2007
Field 56319 29/08/2007 2680380 30/08/2007
Biden 10381 29/08/2007 2259186 29/08/2007
Gingrich 8996 29/08/2007 316889 29/08/2007
Richardson 8042 29/08/2007 194473 28/08/2007
Dodd 952 29/08/2007 10627 11/09/2007
Allen 24 29/08/2006 22535 04/03/2007
Warner, M 24 15/09/2006 48353 11/05/2007
Winning Republican 50337 20/10/2004 960177 10/02/2007
Party Democratic 44392 20/10/2004 824830 10/02/2007
Field 30104 10/11/2004 542064 10/02/2007
Table 8: List of contracts of the four markets included in this study. Each market is sorted by
real-money volume, in descending order.
B Test Results
Throughout the time series analyis, the number of lags are selected according to the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC).
In contrast to standard practice where stars represent the level at which an hypothesis
is rejected, the stars for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test represent not rejecting the null
hypothesis of a unit root at a specified level, as seen in unit root tests on levels (Appendix B.1)
and first differences (Appendix B.2).
In the cointegration tests (Appendix B.3) the null hypothesis is rejected when the test
statistic (trace statistic) exceeds the critical value, Cointegration is present whenever the null
hypothesis of “none” cointegrating relationships is rejected and the hypothesis of “at most 1”
is accepted.
In the table for the VECM α-restrictions (Appendix B.4), the restrictions αp = 0 and
αr = 0 (see equations (2) and (3)) are denoted by respectively A(1, 1) = 0 and A(1, 2) = 0,
as they are identified by Eviews.
In the Granger causality tests (Appendix B.5), rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that
Granger causality is present.
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B.1 Unit Root Test Results: Levels
Det. Lags Critical value
Market Contract Real / Play Comp. (AIC) t-stat. 1% 5% 10% Sig.
Democratic Biden Play i 3 -2.8497 -3.4621 -2.8754 -2.5742 **
Nomination Real i 12 -2.2471 -3.4619 -2.8753 -2.5742 ***
Clinton Play i,t 3 -2.5021 -4.0032 -3.4318 -3.1396 ***
Real i,t 0 -2.9154 -4.0005 -3.4305 -3.1388 ***
Dodd Play i,t 11 -1.8504 -4.0093 -3.4347 -3.1413 ***
Real i,t 14 -2.5219 -4.0034 -3.4319 -3.1397 ***
Edwards Play i 6 0.7670 -3.4636 -2.8760 -2.5746 ***
Real i 6 -1.0617 -3.4610 -2.8749 -2.5740 ***
Field Play i 9 -1.4975 -3.4652 -2.8768 -2.5750 ***
Real i 7 -1.6023 -3.4612 -2.8750 -2.5740 ***
Gore Play i 1 -1.6062 -3.4612 -2.8750 -2.5740 ***
Real i 1 -1.8117 -3.4603 -2.8746 -2.5738 ***
Obama Play i,t 3 -2.5375 -4.0032 -3.4318 -3.1396 ***
Real i,t 0 -2.8935 -4.0005 -3.4305 -3.1388 ***
Richardson Play i,t 10 -1.4307 -4.0084 -3.4343 -3.1411 ***
Real i,t 11 -1.3609 -4.0028 -3.4316 -3.1395 ***
Republican Bloomberg Play i 0 -10.7409 -3.4699 -2.8788 -2.5761
(Period 1) Real i 0 -5.6682 -3.4695 -2.8786 -2.5760
Gingrich Play i 0 -4.7227 -3.4699 -2.8788 -2.5761
Real i 2 -3.4028 -3.4699 -2.8788 -2.5761 *
Giuliani Play i,t 9 -2.3471 -4.0213 -3.4405 -3.1447 ***
Real i,t 0 -1.9240 -4.0136 -3.4368 -3.1425 ***
Huckabee Play i 0 -3.3907 -3.4699 -2.8788 -2.5761 *
Real i 0 -1.2557 -3.4695 -2.8786 -2.5760 ***
Hunter Play i 12 -2.7458 -3.4768 -2.8818 -2.5777 **
Real i 5 -3.9629 -3.4707 -2.8792 -2.5762
McCain Play i 10 -0.2878 -3.4755 -2.8813 -2.5774 ***
Real i 10 -0.1408 -3.4720 -2.8797 -2.5765 ***
Paul Play i 2 -0.5779 -3.4709 -2.8793 -2.5763 ***
Real i 4 -0.7353 -3.4704 -2.8790 -2.5762 ***
Rice Play i 5 -1.6657 -3.4725 -2.8800 -2.5767 ***
Real i 4 -1.5193 -3.4704 -2.8790 -2.5762 ***
Romney Play i 5 -1.0977 -3.4725 -2.8800 -2.5767 ***
Real i 8 -1.3355 -3.4715 -2.8795 -2.5764 ***
Thompson, F Play i,t 1 -2.3948 -4.0150 -3.4375 -3.1429 ***
Real i,t 4 -1.7567 -4.0150 -3.4375 -3.1429 ***
Republican Field Play i 7 -2.1761 -3.5256 -2.9030 -2.5889 ***
(Period 2) Real i 1 -3.7367 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864
Gingrich Play i 0 -2.1176 -3.5167 -2.8991 -2.5869 ***
Real i 1 -4.4818 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864
Giuliani Play i 2 -0.8422 -3.5191 -2.9001 -2.5874 ***
Real i 4 0.8412 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864 ***
Huckabee Play i 0 -3.5533 -3.5167 -2.8991 -2.5869
Real i 1 -3.2520 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864 *
McCain Play i 0 -3.9727 -3.5167 -2.8991 -2.5869
Real i 2 -2.4974 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864 ***
Paul Play i 0 -1.4738 -3.5167 -2.8991 -2.5869 ***
Real i 0 -8.6469 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864
Rice Play i 7 -1.7939 -3.5256 -2.9030 -2.5889 ***
Real i 0 -1.6528 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864 ***
Romney Play i 0 -2.1137 -3.5167 -2.8991 -2.5869 ***
Real i 7 -2.3044 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864 ***
Thompson, F Play i 0 -2.5175 -3.5167 -2.8991 -2.5869 ***
Real i 3 -3.8849 -3.5144 -2.8981 -2.5864
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Det. Lags Critical value Sig.
Market Contract Real / Play Comp. (AIC) t-stat. 1% 5% 10%
Individual Biden Play i 13 -1.2737 -3.4610 -2.8749 -2.5740 ***
Winner Real i 8 -3.1726 -3.4566 -2.8730 -2.5730 *
Bloomberg Play i 2 -3.5518 -3.4568 -2.8730 -2.5730
Real i 3 -2.2038 -3.4561 -2.8728 -2.5728 ***
Clinton Play i,t 2 -3.0084 -3.9958 -3.4282 -3.1375 ***
Real i,t 0 -2.8566 -3.9943 -3.4275 -3.1371 ***
Edwards Play i,t 13 0.5213 -4.0017 -3.4311 -3.1392 ***
Real i,t 4 -1.8671 -3.9949 -3.4278 -3.1372 ***
Field Play i 13 -1.6557 -3.4610 -2.8749 -2.5740 ***
Real i 6 -0.0365 -3.4564 -2.8729 -2.5729 ***
Gingrich Play i 14 -2.9311 -3.4615 -2.8751 -2.5741 *
Real i 14 -3.9898 -3.4573 -2.8733 -2.5731
Giuliani Play i 14 -0.8253 -3.4615 -2.8751 -2.5741 ***
Real i 0 -0.7784 -3.4558 -2.8726 -2.5728 ***
Gore Play i 1 -1.7804 -3.4565 -2.8730 -2.5729 ***
Real i 2 -1.8751 -3.4560 -2.8727 -2.5728 ***
Huckabee Play i 6 -1.1141 -3.4582 -2.8737 -2.5733 ***
Real i 0 -1.5535 -3.4558 -2.8726 -2.5728 ***
McCain Play i,t 10 -1.5411 -3.9999 -3.4302 -3.1387 ***
Real i,t 4 -1.2313 -3.9949 -3.4278 -3.1372 ***
Obama Play i,t 3 -2.7586 -3.9963 -3.4284 -3.1376 ***
Real i,t 0 -2.4183 -3.9943 -3.4275 -3.1371 ***
Paul Play i 8 -0.2915 -3.4590 -2.8740 -2.5735 ***
Real i 7 -1.1426 -3.4565 -2.8730 -2.5729 ***
Richardson Play i 14 -1.3737 -3.4615 -2.8751 -2.5741 ***
Real i 5 -4.9567 -3.4563 -2.8729 -2.5729
Romney Play i,t 3 -2.5130 -3.9963 -3.4284 -3.1376 ***
Real i,t 0 -2.5246 -3.9943 -3.4275 -3.1371 ***
Thompson, F Play i,t 10 -2.3775 -3.9999 -3.4302 -3.1387 ***
Real i,t 11 -3.3818 -3.9960 -3.4283 -3.1375 **
Party Democratic Play i 8 -1.4136 -3.4450 -2.8679 -2.5702 ***
Winner Real i 3 -1.2299 -3.4442 -2.8675 -2.5700 ***
Field Play i 14 -1.4690 -3.4456 -2.8682 -2.5704 ***
Real i 1 -2.1141 -3.4441 -2.8675 -2.5700 ***
Republican Play i 6 -3.5537 -3.4448 -2.8678 -2.5702
Real i 1 -2.1308 -3.4441 -2.8675 -2.5700 ***
Table 9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on levels. (Det. Comp.: Deterministic Components; i: inter-
cept; t: trend; *: 1% level; **: 5% level; ***: 10% level).
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B.2 Unit Root Test Results: First Differences
Det. Lags Critical value Sig.
Market Contract Real / Play Comp. (AIC) t-stat. 1% 5% 10%
Democratic Biden Play 2 -13.1841 -2.5762 -1.9424 -1.6157
Nomination Real 11 -7.5539 -2.5762 -1.9424 -1.6157
Clinton Play i 2 -8.4755 -3.4621 -2.8754 -2.5742
Real i 0 -15.8284 -3.4603 -2.8746 -2.5738
Dodd Play i 8 -8.3686 -3.4652 -2.8768 -2.5750
Real i 13 -3.9147 -3.4623 -2.8755 -2.5743
Edwards Play 5 -8.4166 -2.5768 -1.9424 -1.6156
Real 5 -5.8678 -2.5759 -1.9423 -1.6157
Field Play 0 -15.9123 -2.5759 -1.9423 -1.6157
Real 6 -6.1032 -2.5759 -1.9423 -1.6157
Gore Play 1 -11.4713 -2.5761 -1.9424 -1.6157
Real 0 -16.5043 -2.5756 -1.9423 -1.6157
Obama Play i 2 -7.1049 -3.4621 -2.8754 -2.5742
Real i 0 -15.5597 -3.4603 -2.8746 -2.5738
Richardson Play i 9 -5.9330 -3.4658 -2.8770 -2.5751
Real i 10 -6.7024 -3.4618 -2.8753 -2.5742
Republican Bloomberg Play 3 -7.4811 -2.5797 -1.9429 -1.6154
(Period 1) Real 3 -10.1977 -2.5791 -1.9428 -1.6154
Gingrich Play 11 -5.7074 -2.5813 -1.9431 -1.6152
Real 1 -9.6305 -2.5790 -1.9428 -1.6154
Giuliani Play i 8 -4.3406 -3.4749 -2.8810 -2.5772
Real i 0 -11.8592 -3.4697 -2.8787 -2.5760
Huckabee Play 0 -19.7689 -2.5791 -1.9428 -1.6154
Real 0 -12.8123 -2.5789 -1.9427 -1.6154
Hunter Play 11 -5.3823 -2.5813 -1.9431 -1.6152
Real 7 -6.8619 -2.5795 -1.9428 -1.6154
McCain Play 9 -1.6206 -2.5809 -1.9430 -1.6153 **
Real 9 -2.1046 -2.5797 -1.9429 -1.6154 *
Paul Play 1 -11.9585 -2.5793 -1.9428 -1.6154
Real 3 -6.6364 -2.5791 -1.9428 -1.6154
Rice Play 4 -8.5895 -2.5799 -1.9429 -1.6154
Real 3 -9.0817 -2.5791 -1.9428 -1.6154
Romney Play 4 -4.8697 -2.5799 -1.9429 -1.6154
Real 6 -4.4239 -2.5794 -1.9428 -1.6154
Thompson, F Play i 9 -2.9091 -3.4755 -2.8813 -2.5774 *
Real i 1 -7.6852 -3.4699 -2.8788 -2.5761
Republican Field Play 6 -4.9815 -2.5979 -1.9455 -1.6138
(Period 2) Real 1 -9.6988 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
Gingrich Play 1 -7.8528 -2.5957 -1.9451 -1.6140
Real 11 -5.7610 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
Giuliani Play 1 -9.1425 -2.5957 -1.9451 -1.6140
Real 3 -7.0020 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
Huckabee Play 0 -10.5780 -2.5953 -1.9451 -1.6140
Real 0 -7.6197 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
McCain Play 6 -2.8986 -2.5979 -1.9455 -1.6138
Real 1 -10.2231 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
Paul Play 0 -7.8602 -2.5953 -1.9451 -1.6140
Real 3 -7.5728 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
Rice Play 6 -4.8866 -2.5979 -1.9455 -1.6138
Real 0 -9.6539 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
Romney Play 1 -8.1959 -2.5957 -1.9451 -1.6140
Real 0 -9.6206 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
Thompson, F Play 1 -6.7772 -2.5957 -1.9451 -1.6140
Real 2 -7.8486 -2.5942 -1.9449 -1.6141
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Det. Lags Critical value Sig.
Market Contract Real / Play Comp. (AIC) t-stat. 1% 5% 10%
Individual Biden Play 12 -7.9081 -2.5759 -1.9423 -1.6157
Winner Real 7 -8.7843 -2.5743 -1.9421 -1.6158
Bloomberg Play 9 -8.0722 -2.5754 -1.9423 -1.6157
Real 3 -11.0732 -2.5742 -1.9421 -1.6159
Clinton Play i 1 -11.6162 -3.4568 -2.8731 -2.5730
Real i 0 -17.2758 -3.4559 -2.8727 -2.5728
Edwards Play i 12 -7.0930 -3.4610 -2.8749 -2.5740
Real i 3 -11.6091 -3.4562 -2.8728 -2.5729
Field Play 13 -7.9212 -2.5760 -1.9423 -1.6157
Real 5 -9.3067 -2.5742 -1.9421 -1.6159
Gingrich Play 8 -10.3813 -2.5753 -1.9422 -1.6158
Real 15 -5.7760 -2.5746 -1.9422 -1.6158
Giuliani Play 13 -2.6426 -2.5760 -1.9423 -1.6157
Real 0 -15.1797 -2.5741 -1.9421 -1.6159
Gore Play 0 -21.0636 -2.5743 -1.9421 -1.6158
Real 1 -14.3700 -2.5741 -1.9421 -1.6159
Huckabee Play 5 -9.5821 -2.5749 -1.9422 -1.6158
Real 5 -9.5821 -2.5749 -1.9422 -1.6158
McCain Play i 9 -4.3474 -3.4598 -2.8744 -2.5737
Real i 3 -8.4339 -3.4562 -2.8728 -2.5729
Obama Play i 2 -7.3049 -3.4572 -2.8732 -2.5731
Real i 4 -7.4384 -3.4563 -2.8729 -2.5729
Paul Play 7 -7.7693 -2.5751 -1.9422 -1.6158
Real 6 -5.5429 -2.5743 -1.9421 -1.6158
Richardson Play 13 -8.6629 -2.5760 -1.9423 -1.6157
Real 14 -7.6348 -2.5746 -1.9421 -1.6158
Romney Play i 2 -9.5238 -3.4572 -2.8732 -2.5731
Real i 0 -16.6465 -3.4559 -2.8727 -2.5728
Thompson, F Play i 1 -15.3444 -3.4568 -2.8731 -2.5730
Real i 10 -3.1202 -3.4570 -2.8731 -2.5730 *
Party Democratic Play 7 -12.1750 -2.5702 -1.9415 -1.6162
Winner Real 2 -15.6615 -2.5699 -1.9415 -1.6162
Field Play 13 -6.6728 -2.5704 -1.9416 -1.6162
Real 3 -12.8937 -2.5699 -1.9415 -1.6162
Republican Play 7 -11.9395 -2.5702 -1.9415 -1.6162
Real 2 -14.8161 -2.5699 -1.9415 -1.6162
Table 10: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on first differences. (Det. Comp.: Deterministic Components;
i: intercept; t: trend; *: 1% level; **: 5% level; ***: 10% level).
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B.3 Cointegration Test Results
Lags Crit. val.
Market Contract (AIC) Coint. Hyp. Trace stat. 5% p-value
Democratic Biden 8 None 18.7818 25.8721 0.2938
Nomination At most 1 5.0419 12.5180 0.5904
Clinton 1 None 100.6215 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 9.8623 12.5180 0.1335
Dodd 5 None 35.2054 25.8721 0.0026
At most 1 4.4825 12.5180 0.6716
Edwards 6 None 17.2190 25.8721 0.3988
At most 1 1.1648 12.5180 0.9976
Field 8 None 21.2049 25.8721 0.1710
At most 1 2.8815 12.5180 0.8903
Gore 2 None 51.5559 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 4.1141 12.5180 0.7255
Obama 5 None 37.2141 25.8721 0.0013
At most 1 7.1952 12.5180 0.3246
Richardson 7 None 16.0575 25.8721 0.4880
At most 1 6.3938 12.5180 0.4120
Republican Giuliani 1 None 84.5643 25.8721 0.0000
(Period 1) At most 1 10.8147 12.5180 0.0947
Paul 1 None 67.6616 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 6.6017 12.5180 0.3879
Rice 3 None 40.5192 25.8721 0.0004
At most 1 9.1090 12.5180 0.1737
Romney 6 None 23.9893 25.8721 0.0842
At most 1 7.0631 12.5180 0.3380
Thompson, F 1 None 105.6917 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 14.6820 12.5180 0.0214
Republican Giuliani 5 None 20.6812 25.8721 0.1933
(Period 2) At most 1 5.8645 12.5180 0.4777
Rice 7 None 19.7468 25.8721 0.2390
At most 1 8.6499 12.5180 0.2031
Romney 2 None 24.4356 25.8721 0.0747
At most 1 5.6736 12.5180 0.5028
Individual Clinton 1 None 100.1151 25.8721 0.0000
Winner At most 1 8.5705 12.5180 0.2085
Edwards 4 None 36.2401 25.8721 0.0018
At most 1 1.3661 12.5180 0.9943
Field 3 None 37.2315 25.8721 0.0013
At most 1 5.0404 12.5180 0.5906
Giuliani 7 None 29.9583 25.8721 0.0146
At most 1 1.9539 12.5180 0.9714
Gore 6 None 27.5805 25.8721 0.0304
At most 1 4.5664 12.5180 0.6594
Huckabee 6 None 63.0859 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 3.5160 12.5180 0.8104
McCain 5 None 35.3409 25.8721 0.0025
At most 1 2.1680 12.5180 0.9574
Obama 4 None 53.1762 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 8.3355 12.5180 0.2255
Paul 5 None 58.2292 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 6.0517 12.5180 0.4538
Romney 1 None 86.7657 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 5.8113 12.5180 0.4846
Thompson, F 8 None 60.8395 25.8721 0.0000
At most 1 19.9372 12.5180 0.0024
Party Democratic 2 None 130.0276 25.8721 0.0000
Winner At most 1 4.8289 12.5180 0.6211
Field 5 None 25.0531 25.8721 0.0630
At most 1 3.1832 12.5180 0.8541
Table 11: Cointegration test results.
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B.4 Causality Tests: VECM Restrictions
Accept/Reject
Market Contract Restriction χ2 p-value (5% level)
Democratic Biden A(1, 1) = 0 5.0527 0.0246 Reject
Nomination A(2, 1) = 0 4.1078 0.0427 Reject
Clinton A(1, 1) = 0 0.0025 0.9604 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 14.9567 0.0001 Reject
Dodd A(1, 1) = 0 26.1808 0.0000 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 1.7604 0.1846 Accept
Edwards A(1, 1) = 0 0.1678 0.6821 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 8.8672 0.0029 Reject
Field A(1, 1) = 0 3.9653 0.0464 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 8.7020 0.0032 Reject
Gore A(1, 1) = 0 1.6388 0.2005 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 26.2203 0.0000 Reject
Obama A(1, 1) = 0 2.8282 0.0926 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 12.2261 0.0005 Reject
Richardson A(1, 1) = 0 2.4521 0.1174 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 0.0902 0.7640 Accept
Republican Giuliani A(1, 1) = 0 9.3688 0.0022 Reject
(Period 1) A(2, 1) = 0 12.0496 0.0005 Reject
McCain A(1, 1) = 0 5.2443 0.0220 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 0.8079 0.3687 Accept
Paul A(1, 1) = 0 12.9595 0.0003 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 20.4829 0.0000 Reject
Rice A(1, 1) = 0 13.0994 0.0003 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 6.4338 0.0112 Reject
Romney A(1, 1) = 0 5.8186 0.0159 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 0.7858 0.3754 Accept
Thompson, F A(1, 1) = 0 24.3540 0.0000 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 9.5512 0.0020 Reject
Republican Giuliani A(1, 1) = 0 5.1290 0.0235 Reject
(Period 2) A(2, 1) = 0 0.1356 0.7127 Accept
Rice A(1, 1) = 0 0.4135 0.5202 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 1.2481 0.2639 Accept
Romney A(1, 1) = 0 6.2495 0.0124 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 2.1759 0.1402 Accept
Individual Clinton A(1, 1) = 0 0.1875 0.6650 Accept
Winner A(2, 1) = 0 12.8795 0.0003 Reject
Edwards A(1, 1) = 0 21.2554 0.0000 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 0.9732 0.3239 Accept
Field A(1, 1) = 0 26.3952 0.0000 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 0.9975 0.3180 Accept
Giuliani A(1, 1) = 0 7.7432 0.0054 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 3.4837 0.0620 Accept
Gore A(1, 1) = 0 9.5401 0.0020 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 0.3569 0.5502 Accept
Huckabee A(1, 1) = 0 1.8318 0.1759 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 39.8957 0.0000 Reject
McCain A(1, 1) = 0 13.0525 0.0003 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 0.5696 0.4504 Accept
Obama A(1, 1) = 0 0.0184 0.8920 Accept
A(2, 1) = 0 10.4997 0.0012 Reject
Paul A(1, 1) = 0 17.6184 0.0000 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 15.7360 0.0001 Reject
Romney A(1, 1) = 0 13.1094 0.0003 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 12.1385 0.0005 Reject
Thompson, F A(1, 1) = 0 17.6970 0.0000 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 0.6672 0.4140 Accept
Party Democrats A(1, 1) = 0 99.2739 0.0000 Reject
Winner A(2, 1) = 0 7.2180 0.0072 Reject
Field A(1, 1) = 0 10.6602 0.0011 Reject
A(2, 1) = 0 3.3617 0.0667 Accept
Table 12: Test results for VECM α-restrictions.
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B.5 Causality Tests: Granger Causality
Accept/Reject
Market Contract Alt. Hyp. p-value d.f. (5% level)
Democratic Biden Real g.c. Play 0.0000 8 Reject
Nomination Play g.c. Real 0.0374 8 Reject
Clinton Real g.c. Play 0.6447 1 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.4681 1 Accept
Dodd Real g.c. Play 0.0024 5 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.0000 5 Reject
Edwards Real g.c. Play 0.0977 6 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0007 6 Reject
Field Real g.c. Play 0.0711 8 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0362 8 Reject
Gore Real g.c. Play 0.3030 2 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.9708 2 Reject
Obama Real g.c. Play 0.0021 5 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.0003 5 Reject
Richardson Real g.c. Play 0.0021 7 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.0000 7 Reject
Republican Giuliani Real g.c. Play 0.6923 1 Accept
(Period 1) Play g.c. Real 0.9609 1 Accept
McCain Real g.c. Play 0.9059 1 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.5496 1 Accept
Paul Real g.c. Play 0.9532 1 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0683 1 Accept
Rice Real g.c. Play 0.6356 3 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0359 3 Reject
Romney Real g.c. Play 0.0740 6 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0033 6 Reject
Thompson, F Real g.c. Play 0.0230 1 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.0826 1 Accept
Republican Giuliani Real g.c. Play 0.1041 5 Accept
(Period 2) Play g.c. Real 0.9244 5 Accept
Rice Real g.c. Play 0.0289 7 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.0319 7 Reject
Romney Real g.c. Play 0.3849 2 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0107 2 Reject
Individual Clinton Real g.c. Play 0.3978 1 Accept
Winner Play g.c. Real 0.2046 1 Accept
Edwards Real g.c. Play 0.0000 4 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.5027 4 Accept
Field Real g.c. Play 0.2443 3 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.4646 3 Accept
Giuliani Real g.c. Play 0.4742 7 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0001 7 Reject
Gore Real g.c. Play 0.1702 6 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0590 6 Accept
Huckabee Real g.c. Play 0.1529 6 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.0000 6 Reject
McCain Real g.c. Play 0.0022 5 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.2372 5 Accept
Obama Real g.c. Play 0.1246 4 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.5407 4 Accept
Paul Real g.c. Play 0.1777 5 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.2641 5 Accept
Romney Real g.c. Play 0.5000 1 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.1950 1 Accept
Thompson, F Real g.c. Play 0.0003 8 Reject
Play g.c. Real 0.0007 8 Reject
Party Democrats Real g.c. Play 0.0197 2 Reject
Winner Play g.c. Real 0.5233 2 Accept
Field Real g.c. Play 0.4478 5 Accept
Play g.c. Real 0.6036 5 Accept
Table 13: Granger Causality test results. (g.c.: Granger causes; d.f.: degrees of freedom).
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B.6 McCain, period 2
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
Lags Critical value
Contract (AIC) t-stat. 1% 5% 10% Sig.
Real-money 0 -3.7399 -3.5155 -2.8986 -2.5866 ***
Play-money 0 -4.3371 -3.5178 -2.8996 -2.5871 ***
Granger causality test
Null Hyp. Lags (AIC) F -stat. p-value
Real does not g.c. Play 1 1.3193 0.2544
Play does not g.c. Real 1 1.2801 0.2615
Table 14: Test results on McCain in period two. (g.c: Granger causes; ***: 1% level).
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